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PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION. By Julie C.
Inness.t New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. ix,
157. $24.95.
Daniel A. Farber2
"Quagmire, privacy as deep."
So reads an entry in the index of this book. Unlike most index
entries, this one is not only useful but profound. As the author
notes, privacy seems to be based on firm, widely shared understandings. But "the ground softens as we discover the confusion underlying our privacy intuitions." Indeed, prominent scholars have tried
to escape the swamp by abandoning the concept of privacy
altogether.
Professor Inness's goal in this book is to define privacy and
defend its moral value. She views all of the various aspects of privacy as methods of controlling intimate aspects of life. She then
seeks to provide a moral foundation for intimacy on the basic
human capacity for "love, liking, and care." She contends that her
theory provides a moral basis for both informational privacy and
what she calls "constitutional privacy"-the rights recognized by
the Supreme Court in Roe and Griswold.J
Part I of this review will discuss and expand upon Professor
Inness's response to privacy skepticism. Part II will explain how
her own view of privacy, while helpful, fails as a foundational theory. Part III closes with a discussion of the prospects for a general
theory of privacy.
I

One of Professor Inness's main goals is to challenge the "privacy skeptics" who seek to escape the quagmire by abandoning the
concept altogether. Her primary fire is directed against Judith
Jarvis Thomson and others who have argued that privacy is a dispensable concept. Anything that is protected by the so-called right
to privacy, Thomson argued, also turns out to be protected by some
other moral right, such as a property entitlement. Moreover, priI. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Mount Holyoke College.
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, University of
Minnesota.
3. I will follow her usage in distinguishing these two types of privacy, although her
terminology is somewhat inaccurate, since the Constitution gives more explicit protection to
"informational privacy" in the Fourth Amendment than it does to what she calls "constitu·
tional privacy."
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vacy skeptics have argued, the various instances of privacy rights
really have nothing much in common. In short, the concept of privacy does no significant analytical work.
In response to Thomson, Inness argues that some aspects of
the right to privacy do not involve other rights. Although her evidence is somewhat debatable,4 her point seems valid. For instance,
the right to privacy clearly protects against a wiretap of a phone
conversation, yet the wiretap may involve no invasion of the
speaker's property rights. Also, as Inness argues cogently, privacy
would not necessarily be a superfluous concept even if every example of privacy also could be classified as an example of some other
right.s For example, one reason for supporting property rights may
be that they protect privacy interests.
A related form of skepticism argues that informational and
constitutional privacy have nothing in common. In contrast, Justice Douglas attempted in Griswold to link the right to use contraception with the impermissibility of police searches of the martial
bedroom. Although often criticized, Douglas's effort to connect informational and constitutional privacy is not implausible. If we especially object to searches of the marital bedroom, we must believe
that much of what goes on there is none of the government's business. This belief seems relevant to determining the scope of the government's regulatory power as well as the scope of its investigatory
power.6
Abortion laws do not call for any searches of the marital bedroom, but even so, concerns about informational privacy are not
wholly irrelevant. A companion case to Roe involved the more enlightened American Law Institute's model abortion statute, which
required that the abortion decision be affirmed by a hospital committee and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed
by independent examinations of the patient by two other physicians.
These are rather striking intrusions on informational privacy, particularly because psychological, emotional and familial factors were
4. Her main example is the right of the sender of a letter to control the dissemination
of its contents. In our legal system, however, this right comes under the rubric of copyright
law rather than privacy.
5. The best possible classification scheme may separate entities with some similarities
into different categories; we may well find it useful to observe these similarities across categories. For example, butterflies and bats belong to very different zoological groups, but the
concept of "flying animals" remains meaningful and useful.
6. The linkage between constitutional and informational privacy may work in the opposite direction as well. If revealing information about personal sexual practices constitutes a
tort, at least one reason for preventing dissemination of the information is probably to leave
individuals free from public pressure on such matters.
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considered relevant. 1 In short, we should not be too quick to dismiss the possibility that informational and constitutional privacy
are indeed linked at some level.
Another critique of privacy has come from feminists. In arguing that "the personal is the political," they have often denied (or at
least seemed to deny) the existence of any genuine separation between the private and public. Somewhat contradictorily, they have
also argued that privacy does exist but that it is bad, because it
shields the abuse of women within the home from public scrutiny
and control. Both aspects of the feminist position have recently
been the subject of a thoughtful critique by Ruth Gavison.s She
shows that most feminist writing, on close analysis, exhibits an effort toward a deeper understanding of the public/private distinction
and advocates redrawing the boundary, instead of abolition. Those
few feminists who actually seek abolition of privacy, rather than
reform, have failed to make a plausible case.
Other attacks on privacy have come from those at the opposite
end of the political spectrum from feminists. Conservative skeptics
argue that privacy is merely a personal preference with no special
moral standing. Richard Posner has suggested that even informational privacy may actually be undesirable, since it allows people to
conceal secrets and thereby defraud others in economic and social
transactions.9 Regarding constitutional privacy, Robert Bork compared a state law regulating contraceptives (to protect those who
were offended by contraception) to a pollution regulation (protecting those who are adversely affected by smog). He found no difference except personal preference between the two.w
Posner's intensely skeptical initial views have been somewhat
modified in later economic analyses. II The justifications for informational privacy are even stronger if we relax the traditional economic assumption of complete human rationality. In reality, rather
than responding rationally, others might well overreact to a dramatic episode of misconduct in a person's past. Cognitive psycholo7. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Similarly, judicial bypass procedures involve a
judge's inquiry into the intimate personal aspects of a minor's life. See Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990).
8. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 Stan. L. Rev. I
(1992).
9. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 399-400 (1978).
10. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. I, 8-10 (1971).
II. See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 Buff. L. Rev. I. 14-15,
22-23 (1979); John P. Gould, Privacy and the Economics of Information, 9 J. Legal Stud. 827
( 1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optional Extent of Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 775, 787-96 (1980).

1993]

BOOK REVIEWS

513

gists have collected a rich menagerie of human irrationalities.
Among the most common is the tendency to overweigh data which
is recent and dramatic, at the expense of more reliable background
information. For example, people are more afraid of flying than of
driving, even though flying is safer, in part because airplane crashes
are highly dramatic and visible events. For the same reason, a vivid
example of prior misconduct is also likely to be given too much
weight.l2 Thus, restricting access to such information may be socially desirable.
Bork's position seems to view preferences as essentially fungible, whether we are considering the moralistic preferences of religious groups versus the preference of couples for family planning,
or the preference of industry for higher profits versus that of pollution victims for clean air.n In this respect, his analysis seems consistent with the general flattening of human values that often
characterizes economic analysis. Since any human culture necessarily treats some preferences as more fundamental than others, this
rhetorical skepticism is inevitably jarring; Bork sounds almost like a
visitor from another planet, who simply doesn't understand how we
experience our lives.
However useful this treatment of preferences may be for economic analysis, it seems lacking as a normative approach. By treating all values as merely "tastes," it assumes that values cannot be
the subject of rational discussion, and therefore must be treated as
arbitrary preferences. Yet, we do find it possible to discuss moral
issues. Whether the reason is that moral values have some objective
existence or that our shared culture generates some fundamental
consensus, we are often able to find some common ground on which
to form judgments.
Like Inness, I find the case for privacy skepticism unpersuasive. Apart from our shared intuitions about the importance and
scope of privacy, the strongest evidence that there is "something
there" is provided by the scholarship in the field. There have been a
number of important efforts to provide an intellectual foundation
for privacy. Although none of them has been wholly successful,
they have uncovered connections between various privacy rights
12. For a survey of the literature, see Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 198-217
(Cambridge U. Press, 1988).
13. Bork could well respond that he is speaking only of the requirements of neutrality
for judges in constitutional cases. But if our culture embodies some strong distinctions between various types of preferences, it is difficult to see why "neutrality" should require judges
to treat as identical preferences that are culturally defined as radically different. Treating
unlike things as if they were alike is just as much a violation of neutrality as treating like
things differently.
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and have linked those rights to central cultural values. While they
fall short of their intellectual ambitions, the partial successes of
these theories indicate that "privacy" is not merely an arbitrary collection of unrelated preferences for certain activities. In particular,
as we will see, while Professor Inness's theory is only partially successful, it incorporates some genuine insights about the nature of
privacy.
II

If privacy is not an empty concept or an arbitrary preference,
just what is it? Professor Inness rejects efforts to define privacy as
the equivalent of seclusion. As she observes, it would be ironic to
compliment a prisoner in solitary confinement on the extent of his
privacy. Similarly, we would not say that a dissident enjoyed the
luxury of perfect privacy if her government had banned all public
mention of her existence. Thus, seclusion and secrecy do not aptly
define privacy; there seems to be an important element of personal
control as well. On the other hand, information control extends
beyond privacy; trade secret law, for example, does not seem to involve privacy, even though it involves control over information.
Consequently, Inness limits privacy to a narrower domain. She defines privacy as "the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which includes decisions about intimate access,
intimate information, and intimate actions." In turn, she defines an
action as intimate if it "draws its meaning and value for the agent
from her love, liking, or care" for another person.t4
This analysis contains some important insights. In classifying
an action as intimate, Inness properly focuses on its "meaning or
value to the agent." Thus, intimacy is not necessarily an inherent
aspect of certain acts; it may well have a cultural component.
Moreover, Inness also seems right to view privacy as relating to
emotional relationships. Her theory fails, however, to account for
some other important aspects of privacy.
To begin with, while voluntariness is an important aspect of
privacy, the concept of control requires elaboration. Privacy would
seem to cover nudity as an aspect of intimacy; the Peeping Tom is a
classic invader of privacy. If privacy includes the right to "control"
visual access to one's body, then it should include not only the right
to preclude such access but also the right to allow it. Yet, it seems
decidedly odd to say that public indecency laws violate a flasher's
14. Conceivably, these same emotions might have a nonhuman focus, as in the situation
of a beloved pet. Although Inness does not discuss this possibility, expanding the concept of
intimacy in this way would seem consistent with her analysis.

1993]

BOOK REVIEWS

515

right to privacy. If anything, the flasher seems to be invading the
privacy of others with an unwanted intimacy. In other settings,
"privacy as control" fails to work because the conduct in question is
inherently nonindividualistic: as the old saying goes, it takes two to
tango. If privacy is defined as control and extends to marriage, we
would have to say that it incorporates the power to control whom
you marry-a right that no individual has in a society where marriage requires the consent of both parties. Is We need to say either
that privacy is the mutual right of both partners to exercise joint
control, or else that it is the individual right to offer or accept
intimacy.
Inness's definition of intimacy also needs refinement. She defines intimacy on the basis of emotional significance. But this definition seems both too broad and too narrow. It is too narrow,
because such paradigmatically private activities as sexual acts may
or may not be motivated by "love, liking, or caring," depending on
the context. Yet, privacy does not include only long-term, emotionally meaningful sexual relationships. On the other hand, this definition is also too broad. People express "love, liking, or caring" in
many ways such as buying gifts or cooking meals, but these would
not normally be considered intimate acts.
Inness does seem correct in seeing privacy invasions as boundary crossings: something that is normally part of the intimate
sphere is involuntarily transferred to the public sphere. In part, as
she says, the injury is that the individual's ability to manage her
intimate relationships is damaged. But there is also a correlative
injury to the individual's ability to manage her public relationships,
and this injury may also be substantiaJ.I6 In our society, for example, nudity often functions as a powerful symbol of intimacy, while
clothing is an important method of creating a social image. Thus,
requiring a person to strip both imposes an undesired intimacy and
impairs control over self-presentation in public.11
15. Similarly, if we define privacy as control over intimate affairs, and include
parenthood as an intimate affair, we must also conclude that men in our society do not have
full privacy rights, since under Roe women have the ultimate legal power to control reproduction. Classifying child rearing as an aspect of privacy also seems problematic if control is
the test: after a child is born, as a practical matter, the parents lose full control of the relationship, and instead are more or less committed to some form of parental relationship.
16. As Bob Post has emphasized, privacy seems closely connected with our culture's
definitions of social roles; an invasion of privacy usually involves disrupting an individual's
ability to manage social roles appropriately and to thereby control her social identity. Robert
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort,
77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989) ("Social Foundations").
17. For instance, "dressing for success" won't work if others own your nude photo.
Thus, privacy protects not just control over intimate relationships but also the ability to
control impersonal ones.
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Apart from these difficulties in Inness's definition of privacy,
there are also problems with her attempt to demonstrate that privacy as so defined should be accorded any moral status. Inness
seeks to connect control over intimate relationships with the nature
of personhood itself:
If personhood makes claims on the agent as both an emotional and a rational being, it follows that an adequate principle
of respect for persons must incorporate respect for each aspect:
to respect another as a person is to respect her as both a rational
chooser and an emotional chooser, a being with the capacity to
make decisions with respect to her love, care, and liking. We
must respect the agent's autonomy with regard to loving, caring,
and liking as well as rational choice. Is

Here again, Inness's analysis is both illuminating and insufficient. It is illuminating in its effort to expand moral personhood
beyond simple rational autonomy. There is something lacking in a
purely rational concept of personhood; this lack can be seen perhaps
in the flattened vision of humanity reflected in some law and economics analyses of privacy issues. Inness deserves applause for her
efforts to supplement this vision of personhood, but she leaves her
own vision almost undefended. Yet it seems vulnerable to at least
two criticisms.
First, it is one thing to say that certain emotional capacities are
important moral virtues; it is another to incorporate them into the
definition of personhood. In defense of this incorporation, Inness
says only that we would question whether someone who lacked
these capacities was really a person or was morally responsible for
her acts. Yet, there are many other traits whose absence might give
rise to similar doubts. Some people might question whether an individual who completely lacked the capacity for religious awareness,
or a desire to contribute to the community, or aesthetic sensibility,
could be considered to have the full attributes of personhood. We
are left in the dark about why, among the many moral virtues and
desirable personal traits, the ones Inness identifies are the defining
marks of personhood.
Second, her treatment of these attributes themselves is off-key.
In her defense of "liking, loving, and caring" as basic to personhood, she says that "such positively valued emotional states as
these are not commonly viewed as manifestations of rationality, yet
the capacity to experience these states still seems to be intrinsic to
18. This passage might well be considered "Kantianism in a different voice," expanding
Kant's effort to ground ethics in rational autonomy by adding an emotional dimension to
autonomy.
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personhood." It seems wrong, however, to view friendship and love
as merely descriptions of one individual's emotional state.
Consider the following hypothetical. A drug called Affinity is
developed, which induces paralysis and also has some interesting
emotional effects. In particular, if taken while looking at another
person's picture, the result is an intense feeling of personal attachment, which vanishes completely an hour later when the drug wears
off. Many users develop the habit of taking the drug while looking
at celebrity photographs. The government seeks to ban the drug.
Would such a ban violate the right to privacy, ifthat right is defined
in terms of "love, liking, or caring"? 19
The reason Affinity does not seem to truly provide love, friendship, or caring is that none of these are properly characterized as
individual emotional states. Instead, they are emotional relationships, which have to involve some actual connection between two
people. Inness's definition of privacy is fundamentally individualistic, revolving around an individual's right to control her own intimate emotional life. But if moral value really resides in
relationships rather than in a single individual's emotion, then the
privacy right should protect relationships rather than individuals.
Ill
If her approach were fully successful, Inness would have provided a powerful theory of privacy. It would connect informational
privacy and constitutional privacy via the notion of control over
intimate situations, and explain why that control is entitled to societal respect. Her connecting links do seem to incorporate some genuine insights, but in the end, they are not tight or secure enough to
provide the kind of foundational theory of privacy she is seeking.
But perhaps such a foundational theory is a quixotic goal.
Privacy is the subject of a large and highly diverse body of
scholarship. Professor Inness's work is in the tradition of analytic
philosophy, as are many of the works she discusses; there have also
been some intriguing efforts to bring the work of Foucalt and other
19. One might argue that all mind-altering drugs are protected by the right to personal
autonomy or even by the right to privacy. If so, LSD and other drugs would also be protected; the special attributes of Affinity would not be relevant. But assuming that this is not
true, it seems decidedly peculiar to say that the right to privacy gives special protection to
Affinity as opposed to other mind-altering drugs. Yet, if Inness is right, Affinity would be
entitled to special constitutional protection because we have to respect the autonomy of people as rational emotional choosers whose personhood is defined by the emotional states of
"liking, loving, and caring." After all, Affinity would augment the power to choose these
emotions considerably.
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continental philosophers to bear on the topic of privacy.2o Other
writers have looked beyond philosophy for insights. Economic
analysis, while overlooking some of the deep cultural significance of
privacy, has uncovered significant connections between privacy and
other legal rules governing the dissemination of information. In
Bob Post's hands, sociological theories of group interaction have
illuminated the role of privacy in our culture,21 while feminists have
uncovered some of the harmful effects of privacy in our society.
The problem is not that these theories are unenlightening; the
topic of privacy has not lacked for insightful analyses. Instead, the
problem is an embarrassment of riches: too many incompatible theories, each seeming to contain a genuine insight about some aspect
of privacy. But to the extent they attempt to provide a foundational
theory of privacy, each of these theories must claim to have identified the crucial attribute shared by all instances of "privacy." Without regard to the intelligence or energy of the theorist, such an
effort might well fail for any of three reasons.
First, it may be that there is no trait that uniquely characterizes the collection of entities we call private. Earlier, I rejected the
argument that privacy simply denoted an arbitrary collection of
otherwise unrelated actions, relationships or experiences. It is
tempting to conclude, as Inness does, that if various examples of
privacy are not unrelated, they must all be instances of the same
essential attribute. But this is obviously a false dichotomy. For example, informational privacy may share some important characteristics with reproductive privacy, which shares other important
characteristics with the right to die, which in tum resembles informational privacy in yet another way. We may be dealing with a
family resemblance rather than an essence.
Second, perhaps there is some defining characteristic of the
"private," but this characteristic has limited significance. This
might occur because the characteristic deals with only one dimension of privacy: for example, how privacy is experienced by members of our culture, as opposed to the rules that a just society would
adopt regarding the same situations. Alternatively, privacy might
not be the most important aspect of many private events; their
moral status, for instance, might be more heavily influenced by
other facts. In this situation, we would have a unified theory of
privacy, but the theory would provide only limited insight.
Finally, we might be able to identify a common characteristic
that explains privacy, but we might find that we understood this
20.
21.

See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989).
See Post, Social Foundations (cited in note 16).
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common characteristic even less well than we understand privacy
itself. Because privacy does relate to fundamental aspects of our
experience, we may well be unable to find anything that is both
more fundamental and also more understandable. So we may be in
the position of explaining the mysterious in terms of the utterly
ineffable.
Foundationalism can be a useful aspiration when it goads us
toward the construction of broader and more profound theories.
When it fails to produce the ultimate knowledge it seeks, theorybuilding may still serve as a source of useful insight. But we should
not be too disappointed that foundational theories like Inness's fail
to capture the full complexity and richness of their subjects.

